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EMBARGOES ON EXPORTS OF IDEAS AND
INFORMATION: FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES
ROBERT D. KAMENSHINE*
I. INTRODUCTION
United States efforts to limit the outflow of privately generated
scientific and technological information in the interest of national
security take two forms, restrictions on content of what is commu-
nicated and limitations on contact among communicators.1 Con-
tent restrictions include both civil and criminal penalties and use
of prior restraints. 2 Contact restrictions may involve barring cer-
tain aliens from entering the country or limiting their activities
once here.3 Similar restrictions might be imposed in connection
with foreign travel by United States nationals.4
Much discussion regarding these restrictions raises practical
questions.5 Are such attempts detrimental to United States scien-
tific progress? How can they be reconciled with academic freedom?
Will they really inhibit the military progress of our adversaries?
These are important issues, but they cannot automatically be
equated with those raised under the first amendment. Although
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School; Visiting Lee Professor at the In-
stitute of Bill of Rights Law, 1984-1985, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William
and Mary; B.A. 1961, City College of New York; J.D. 1964, Columbia University Law
School; L.L.M. 1967, Harvard Law School.
1. For a summary of the five statutes applicable to dissemination of privately generated
scientific information, see, Alexander, Preserving High Technology Secrets: National Secur-
ity Controls on University Research and Teaching, 15 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L BUS. 173, 178-
202 (1983).
2. See Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1982).
3. See Neuborne & Shapiro, The Nylon Curtain: America's National Border and the
Free Flow of Ideas, 26 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 719 (1985).
4. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) (former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent's
passport was rescinded after the agent began a scheme of identifying CIA undercover opera-
tives in foreign countries).
5. E.g., Wilson, National Security Control of Technological Information, 25 JuimusTRmcs
J. 109, 129 (1985); Note, National Security Protection: The Critical Technologies Approach
to U.S. Export Control of High-Level Technology, 15 J. INTL. L. & ECON. 575, 599-604
(1981).
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the wisest policy on export of information may be one which mini-
mizes restraints, the first amendment may well permit restrictions
many think ill-advised and counterproductive.
Three recent first amendment analyses 6 suggest that restrictions
on the dissemination of scientific and technological information
must survive a high level of scrutiny. The authors focus on the ex-
tent scientific and technological speech advances traditional first
amendment values.7 They conclude that these values apply and
that consequently the validity of national security restrictions
should be determined under what each deems to be appropriate
first amendment standards.8 One writer, Ferguson, rejects almost
any use of an "intermediate" standard of review comparable to
that applied in commercial speech cases.9 He believes the appro-
priate test for a valid restriction demands a compelling interest
measured by the gravity of the evil to be averted and the likeli-
hood of its occurrence. 10
Unlike Ferguson, Alexander identifies two major types of scien-
tific information. Alexander differentiates noncommercial techno-
logical expression "taking the form of publication of research find-
ings and university instruction of students" from "technical data
transmission in the commercial context."" The commercial com-
munication would receive a more limited protection than that af-
forded the noncommercial scientific communication to which both
Alexander and Ferguson would apply the compelling interest
test. 2
6. Alexander, supra note 1, at 240; Ferguson, Scientific and Technological Expression: A
Problem in First Amendment Theory, 16 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 519 (1981); Comment,
National Security Controls on the Dissemination of Privately Generated Scientific Infor-
mation, 30 UCLA L. REv. 405 (1982); see Note, Executive Order 12,356: The First Amend-
ment Rights of Government Grantees, 64 B.U.L. Rev. 447, 490-96 (1984) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Executive Order 12,3561; Note, The Export Administration Act's Technical Data
Regulations: Do They Violate the First Amendment?, 11 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 563 (1981).
7. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM op FREEDOM OF EXPREsSIoN 6-7 (1970).
8. Alexander, supra, note 1, at 203-04; Ferguson, supra note 6, at 533-43; Comment,
supra note 6, at 436.
9. Ferguson, supra note 6, at 543-47. Even he suggests, however, more limited protection
for the unusual case of "technological information that is only subject to military applica-
tions." Id. at 544.
10. Id. at 554.
11. Alexander, supra note 1, at 204 n.223.
12. Id. at 205-06.
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The student comment author, Funk, also differentiates two
types of scientific information. He would apply a compelling inter-
est standard to information which "contributes to human knowl-
edge and sheds light on the consequences of both alternative na-
tional policies and personal choices."13 All other scientific
information, "chiefly of economic interest" and analogous to com-
mercial speech, would be tested under a lesser intermediate stan-
dard which justifies a restraint if even a "substantial" rather than
an "exceptional" threat to national security is demonstrated. 14
The following first amendment analysis considers four factors.
The first factor addresses the audience to whom the communica-
tion is directed. Most discussions of first amendment rights assume
that the communication is addressed to a domestic audience or at
least assume that the domestic or foreign nature of the audience is
inconsequential. A difference may exist, however, if the audience is
solely foreign. Also, the discussions further assume a mass audi-
ence receives the communication. The dissemination of technologi-
cal and scientific information to a limited audience of a few se-
lected persons, corporations, or governments may be important.
The analysis next considers the source of the communication.
The Supreme Court has held that a corporation's speech receives
first amendment protection. 15 Nevertheless, it may be relevant that
corporate rather than individual communication is involved in a
significant portion of exported technological and scientific
information.
Third, the analysis reviews the subject matter of the communi-
cation. The Court already has identified commercial speech as a
category of communication afforded a lesser degree of protection
than other forms of speech.16 This separate categorization of com-
mercial speech suggests that the technological and scientific nature
of the material also may affect the scope of permissible regulation.
13. Comment, supra note 6, at 436-39.
14. Id. at 437-41.
15. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978).
16. Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); see Metromedia,
Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). Justice White's plurality opinion, id. at 508-11, and
the dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Burger, id. at 556, Justices Rehnquist, id. at 569,
and Stevens, id. at 540, indicate an especially deferential approach to regulation of commer-
cial speech.
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The fourth and final factor considers the role of the regulation's
purpose or effect in first amendment analysis. This factor reviews
the interplay between a regulation's purpose or effect and the ap-
propriate standards of review.
This Article advances five major propositions that account for
the above four factors. First, when scientific or technological infor-
mation is communicated solely to a foreign person, corporation, or
government, the generally cited first amendment values have little
or no application. Second, when the communication reaches a do-
mestic as well as a foreign audience, regulation more directly im-
plicates first amendment values and is vulnerable under conven-
tional first amendment analysis. Third, an alternative and
preferable analytic approach focuses on the first amendment as a
limit on the the appropriate role of government towards the indi-
vidual's mind; a bar to the use of regulatory power to shape view-
point. Fourth, under the just stated proposition, most scientific
and technological speech may be regulated to promote security re-
gardless of detrimental effect on progress, if the regulation is sup-
ported by a rational basis. Fifth, in cases in which scientific and
technological speech is regulated with the purpose or effect of
skewing debate on public policy issues, the regulations must be
subjected to strict review.
II. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COMMUNICATION ADDRESSED
SOLELY TO A FOREIGN AUDIENCE
Communication to an exclusively foreign audience is most likely
when the addressee is a person, corporation or government rather
than the general public. An analogy to antitrust theory relating to
imports and exports may illuminate the problems posed by efforts
to curtail such communication. The concern with restrictions on
"imports" is clear, from both an antitrust and a first amendment
perspective. Antitrust law protects United States consumers of
products and services from anticompetitive activities that reduce
the benefits of foreign competition in the American marketplace. 17
Similarly, the first amendment protects the right of United States
17. 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 10.01 (2d
ed. 1981).
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consumers to receive ideas and information from abroad., s Thus,
in both instances, the rights of consumers in a domestic market-
place are safeguarded.
The theoretical basis for the export aspect of antitrust is more
problematic. While other benefits may flow from such antitrust en-
forcement, for example, preserving business opportunities for indi-
vidual United States firms, improving the balance of trade, or fur-
thering good foreign relations, it is difficult to identify any tangible
benefit to United States consumers.19 The economic interest of
United States antitrust policy in protecting foreign consumers
from exploitation by American firms is not evident.20 A similar
problem of justification arises for the "export" side of first amend-
ment protection as explained below.
A. First Amendment Values and the Foreign Audience
1. Self-Governance
A question exists of how to justify a concern over restrictions on
the flow of information and ideas out of the country.21 This ques-
tion of justification remains even if the restricted material contains
core political expression. The self-governance rationale for freedom
of expression does not fit here completely. Assume a debate on
some aspect of United States foreign policy. No first amendment
self-governance interest exists in informing foreign nationals on
the debate.22 Of course, to the extent that the United States has
18. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
19. Conceivably, blocking anticompetitive actions by United States firms might reduce
the need for retaliatory behavior by foreign firms. Also, maintaining an atmosphere of vigor-
ous competition by United States firms in foreign markets might have a spillover effect on
the firms' behavior in the United States market. Both of these benefits, however, are highly
speculative.
20. 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 17, § 9.06, at 282.
21. See T. EMERSON, supra note 7, at 93-95. Professor Henkin recently suggested that the
Constitution should be more than a compact between citizens and their government. It also
should serve as a "conscience" over all governmental activities, including those affecting
only aliens outside our borders. Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience:
Individual Rights Abroad and at our Gates, 27 W. & MARY L, REv. 11 (1985) (Feb. 27,
1985, Cutler Lecture). The question remains open whether even Professor Henkin's view of
the Constitution as "conscience" would demand concern with information restrictions.
22. A marginal contribution to the "safety valve" function could exist which helps main-
tain a stable and orderly society. See T. EMEsoN, supra note 7. This value, however, is
irrelevant to scientific and technological speech.
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surrendered sovereignty to international institutions, the self-gov-
ernance first amendment theory would apply to communication
addressed to such institutions having a regulatory impact on the
United States.
2. Marketplace of Ideas
Another major rationale for freedom of expression is that it aids
the search for truth.23 Assisting foreign nationals to find truth,
however, is not a first amendment goal. It may be argued that
"free trade in ideas" requires us to give so that we may receive.
Returning to the antitrust analogy, there is criticism of a similar
rationale for United States antitrust enforcement in foreign
trade.24 United States economic rivals are not necessarily commit-
ted to a procompetitive policy. In fact, they may do just the oppo-
site. The same is true in the transnational marketplace of ideas.
The United States cannot guarantee that nationals of other coun-
tries will enjoy freedom of speech. The transnational marketplace
of ideas is as flawed as that for goods and services.
Because much of what is communicated abroad might be availa-
ble to United States consumers of information, it is for the most
part impossible to segregate a domestic market from a transna-
tional market. To the extent that communication intended for for-
eign markets is made available in the United States, the self-gov-
ernance and search for truth theories justify first amendment
protection. No reason exists, however, to permit purely foreign
communication unless we internationalize our concept of the first
amendment or regard foreign pressure on the United States gov-
ernment as part of self-governance.
3. Self-Fulfillment
Another first amendment rationale, individual self-fulfillment,
similarly does not provide a persuasive basis for affording protec-
tion to the purely foreign dissemination of information. With re-
gard to this value, a critical difference may exist if the dissemina-
tor is a corporation rather than an individual. The Supreme Court,
23. See T. EMERSON, supra note 7, at 6.
24. See generally 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 17, § 1.03-05, at 6-7.
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in First National Bank of Boston v. Belotti,25 held that corpora-
tions enjoy a right of free speech. The Court based its decision on
the contribution which corporate speech makes in the marketplace
of ideas. The Court reasoned that the source of the speech did not
matter because the resulting benefit remained the same.26 In
Belotti, protected corporate speech enhanced discussion on the de-
sirability of changes in Massachusetts tax laws. Because corporate
rather than individual free speech was involved, however, no reli-
ance could be placed on the theory that freedom of speech is a
means for the communicator's personal self-fulfillment. Here, only
the benefit to society and to individual recipients mattered.
The above analysis regarding foreign audiences suggests that the
clearest case for refusing to give first amendment protection to ex-
clusively foreign dissemination of information occurs when the dis-
seminator is a corporation. As in Belotti, no self-fulfillment aspect
exists to corporate speech. Moreover, if the material simply is uti-
lized by a foreign government, corporation, or individual recipient,
no marketplace of ideas or self-governance benefit arises within the
United States. We are not constitutionally committed to facilitat-
ing these objectives abroad. 7
In United States v. Edler Industries, Inc.2 8 and Briggs & Strat-
ton Corp. v. Baldrige,29 two United States courts of appeals de-
cided cases involving corporate speech solely to a foreign recipient.
Both courts erroneously assumed that the first amendment auto-
matically applied and that, therefore, a first amendment standard
of review was necessary.
In Edler a United States aerospace corporation provided unclas-
sified technical information, having both military and civilian uses,
to French missile companies. The corporation and its president
were convicted of the unlicensed exporting of technical data relat-
ing to articles on the United States Munitions List.30 Viewing the
technical assistance as a form of commercial speech, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not differentiate
25. 435 u.s. 765 (1978).
26. Id. at 777.
27. But see Henkin, supra note 21, at 18-24.
28. 579 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1978).
29. 728 F.2d 915 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 105 (1984).
30. 579 F.2d at 518.
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between the corporation's rights and those of its president. In-
stead, the court stated that "Edler ha[d] advanced a colorable
claim that the First Amendment furnishes a degree of protection
for. . . dissemination of technological information." 31 By narrowly
construing the statute, however, the court found it unnecessary "to
resolve the precise scope of that protection. '3
2
Unlike Edler, Briggs did not concern transmittal of scientific or
technological information. Rather, it concerned the supply of data
on the business operations of two United States corporations.
These corporations, doing business with Arab countries, were for-
bidden by the Export Administration Act33 from responding to
questions asked by the Arabs' Trade Boycott Office regarding the
Arab boycott of Israel. The two corporations brought separate ac-
tions to vindicate their claim of a first amendment right to answer
the boycott office's questions. Both the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin and the United States
District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, assuming
again that first amendment rights were implicated, focused on
whether the requested information was political or commercial.3 4
The courts determined that the requested information was com-
mercial speech and applied the first amendment standards stated
31. Id. at 520,
32. Id. The statute was said to prohibit "only the exportation of technical data signifi-
cantly and directly related to articles on the Munitions list." Id. at 521. Otherwise, the court
envisioned "serious interference with the interchange of scientific and technological infor-
mation." Id. Moreover, if the information had both peaceful and military applications, the
defendant had to know or have had reason to know that the information was intended for a
prohibited use. As construed, the statute regulated "conduct" with only an incidental limi-
tation upon expression:
Section 1934 and the regulations do not interfere with constitutionally pro-
tected speech. Rather, they control the conduct of assisting foreign enterprises
to obtain military equipment and related technical expertise. So confined, the
statute and regulations are not overbroad. For the same reasons the licensing
provisions of the Act are not unconstitutional prior restraint on speech.
579 F.2d at 521.
Relying on Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), the court further held that public availabil-
ity in the United States "is not a [first amendment] defense recognized by the Constitu-
tion." 579 F.2d at 522.
33. 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2420 (1982).
34. Trane Co. v. Baldrige, 552 F. Supp. 1378 (W.D. Wis. 1983); Briggs & Stratton Corp. v.
Baldrige, 539 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Wis. 1982).
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in Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission3 5 resulting in
validation of both the Act and its implementing regulations. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed
both lower court decisions, adopting the reasoning expressed in
one of the district court opinions, Briggs & Stratton Corp. v.
Baldrige3 6
Unlike corporate speech, when an individual American com-
municates to a foreign recipient the self-fulfillment rationale does
apply. The communicator's self-fulfillment, however, is not isolated
in the major freedom of speech cases because these involve dissem-
ination either directly or indirectly to a domestic audience. Conse-
quently, such cases couple the self-fulfillment rationale with others
principally relating to self-governance and the marketplace of
ideas. Given the frequent coincidence of these rationales, the Su-
preme Court has given no firm indication of the weight to be ac-
corded self-fulfillment alone.37
It is difficult to hypothesize situations in which only the commu-
nicator's self-fulfillment is involved. If one searches enough, socie-
tal impact may be found in every exercise of freedom of speech.
Accepting the proposition that individual communication solely to
a foreign person, corporation, or government, however, is or ap-
proaches a pure case of self-fulfillment, then the foundation for
first amendment protection is weakened. This weakening is due
not only to the absence of the typically cited societal benefits of
free speech, but also, as suggested by Edler and Briggs, to the na-
ture of the material typically communicated.
The preceding discussion of self-fulfillment assumed that all
forms of speech by an individual equally advance this value. This
may not be true. For example, nothing in the Supreme Court's
commercial speech decisions suggests that such speech deserves
35. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
36. 539 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Wis. 1982).
37. One commentator argues that individual self-fulfillment or a "liberty model" is "the
most coherent theory of the first amendment." Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Free-
dom of Speech, 25 U.C.LA. L. REv. 964, 966 (1978). Another suggests that "the one true
value" which the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech ultimately serves is "indi-
vidual self-realization." This term is designed to emphasize both self-development and au-
tonomy of decisionmaking. Professor Redish views other previously identified first amend-
ment values as legitimate but as derivative from individual self-realization. M. REDISH,
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION; A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 11-12 (1984).
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first amendment protection as a matter of self-fulfillment even
when the disseminator is an individual.
In Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council,"s
the Court assumed "that the advertiser's interest is a purely eco-
nomic one" but concluded that this "hardly disqualifies him from
protection under the First Amendment." 9 The Court analogized
the advertiser's commercial speech to the previously sustained
right of free speech in a labor dispute involving a single factory.40
The fate of such a factory, the Court reasoned, could turn on its
ability to advertise as well as on the resolution of its labor difficul-
ties.41 Further, "practices in [this] factory [might] have economic
repercussions upon a whole region and affect widespread systems
of marketing. '42 The Court never suggested that vindicating the
advertiser's personal development for its own sake was an impor-
tant first amendment value. In safeguarding informed decision-
making in the commercial marketplace, the Court stressed the eco-
nomic welfare of individual buyers and sellers and of society.
Whether the Court was right in grafting the "invisible hand of
the free market" onto the more traditionally accepted body of first
amendment benefits is inconsequential here.43 Importantly, self-
fulfillment of the advertiser was not a factor in the Court's reason-
ing. The self-fulfillment rationale arguably could be applied to the
communicator's ability to fashion creative advertising.44 However,
even the view that the self-fulfillment argument best supports the
protection of commercial speech45 appears to place more emphasis
on the interest of the individual recipient than on that of the
advertiser.
When an individual communicates technological and scientific
information to a foreign person, corporation, or government, half
the self-fulfillment rationale immediately disappears. Even when
38. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
39. Id. at 762.
40. Id. at 762-63 (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940)).
41. Id. at 763.
42. Id. (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103 (1940)).
43. See, Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First
Amendment, 65 V. L. Rav. 1 (1979).
44. M. REDISH, supra note 37, at 67.
45. Id. at 60-61.
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the recipient is a foreign individual, no United States constitu-
tional interest arises in fostering the self-fulfillment of a foreign
citizen. With a foreign recipient of the communication, only the
argument based on the communicator's need for self-fulfillment
remains.
Detailed technological information that would pose security
problems if made available overseas is comparable to commercial
speech because the primary justifications for its dissemination do
not relate to the personal development of any particular communi-
cator. Even assuming the communicator's personal development
interest, however, foreign dissemination is not controlled by Vir-
ginia Pharmacy Board because, unlike Virginia's ban on drug price
advertising, a limitation on the export of information still may al-
low domestic dissemination. Thus the communicator's self-fulfill-
ment is just partially or perhaps not at all adversely affected. This
may be true even if internal dissemination is curtailed so that only
limited recipients may obtain the information. Further, publication
of information sometimes may not be critical to self-fulfillment of
an individual whose creative input is channeled into products with
disclosure only within his firm or government agency.
III. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COMMUNICATION REACHING A
MIXED DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN AUDIENCE
A. First Amendment Values and the Mixed Domestic and Foreign
Audience
When communication reaches both a domestic and foreign audi-
ence, a more direct confrontation arises between government regu-
lation of such communication and recognized first amendment val-
ues. The extent to which these values are impaired depends on the
nature of the material regulated. The Supreme Court has assumed
that "scientific" communication is protected speech.46 It has not
considered specifically the application of customarily cited first
amendment rationales.
46. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). See generally New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 762-63, 773 (1982) (the Court dismissed an argument that child pornography
might contain scientific information and therefore receive first amendment protection, but
reiterated protection for medical textbooks).
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1. Self-Governance
Some scientific communication might qualify for protection even
under the view that only political discourse is shielded by the first
amendment.47 This communication may be indistinguishable from
political speech or closely related to it, for example, the theory sug-
gesting the "nuclear winter" consequences of a nuclear war. No
question arises regarding the political character of a newspaper ad
by concerned scientists pointing out the newly identified danger
and therefore urging support of a nuclear freeze or a more concilia-
tory stance on nuclear disarmament talks.4 8 One step removed
from this ad would be publication of a scientific paper setting forth
the "nuclear winter" theory but refraining from specifically urging
any public policy. Nevertheless, the relationship to policy matters
would be evident.
Most scientific and technological information has little or no dis-
cernible connection to a defined public policy issue except that any
contribution to the total store of available information might con-
tribute to informed decisionmaking. 49 The lack of a relationship to
a public policy issue was a major factor in United States v. Pro-
gressive, Inc5 0 in which the United States District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin granted a preliminary injunction
against publication of an article describing how to construct a hy-
drogen bomb. The magazine's publisher argued that the article
would "alert the people. . . to the false illusion of security created
by the government's futile efforts at secrecy." '51 This would give
the people "needed information to make informed decisions on an
urgent issue of public concern." 52 The court responded that "[t]his
Court can find no plausible reason why the public needs to know
the technical details about hydrogen bomb construction to carry on
an informed debate on the issue. '5 3
47. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L. J. 1, 23-35
(1971); see also BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the
Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 355-58 (1978).
48. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
49. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REv. 245, 256-57.
50. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
51. Id. at 994.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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2. The Marketplace of Ideas
Even when the dissemination of scientific and technological in-
formation has only a remote relation to issues of public policy, it
may pertain to the "search for truth" within the particular field.
Consequently, although suppression of the information may not
prejudice any self-governance interest, it is more likely to injure
the free interchange of information which is assumed to yield fur-
ther progress. In the field of scientific inquiry, the "search for
truth" rationale has particular appeal as a justification for free
speech.54
3. Self-Fulfillment
Finally, one must consider the value of self-fulfillment. For those
individuals who are capable of communicating and of understand-
ing scientific and technological information, the free flow of such
material can enhance personal development. Moreover, popular-
ized accounts of scientific and technological advances can contrib-
ute to the sophistication of the layman.
In conclusion, the three rationales discussed above do support
the view55 taken by the previously mentioned authors that restric-
tions on the dissemination of scientific and technological informa-
tion demand a high level of scrutiny. These authors, however, did
not consider whether the nature of the audience, solely foreign or
mixed foreign and domestic, made a difference for first amendment
analysis.5 6 Thus, for the reasons relating to foreign audiences, this
conclusion is restricted to the case involving a mixed domestic and
foreign audience. Assuming this case, Funk's analysis best com-
ports with the Supreme Court's current decisional framework by
drawing a line between fully protected scientific and technological
speech and scientifically oriented commercial speech. This analysis
applied strict review to the scientific speech and an intermediate
standard to the commercial speech.57
54. Ferguson, supra note 6, at 537-41.
55. Alexander, supra note 1; Ferguson, supra note 6; Comment, supra note 6.
56. Alexander does mention the domestic-foreign dichotomy in a footnote. Alexander,
supra note 1, at 205 n.225.
57. Comment, supra note 6, at 436-41. The Edler decision attempted to account for this
sort of distinction by characterizing the transmission of information on a specific product as
1985] 875
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B. An Alternative Analysis for Regulations on Scientific and
Technological Speech
In method of analysis and in ultimate result, the following dis-
cussion takes a different approach from the three authors dis-
cussed earlier. Strict review is necessary, but in a narrower cate-
gory of cases. Furthermore, most restrictions should be reviewed as
ordinary regulations of liberty under a standard requiring only a
rational relationship to a legitimate governmental objective.
1. The First Amendment as a Limit on Government's Role Vis-
6-Vis the Individual's Mind
For the most part, the alternative analysis does not consider
whether a particular category of expression, be it scientific, artistic,
commercial, or political, advances one or more identified values.58
Rather, it addresses the first amendment's central premise regard-
ing the legitimate role of government59 toward the mind of each
individual. The premise assumes that it is almost always invalid
for the government, either as an end in itself or as a means to an
end, to shape the public's thinking by regulating communication.6 0
As Holmes's Lochner v. New York dissents' says, the Constitution
"is made for people of fundamentally differing views. "62
Holmes's viewpoint is most clear when the government invalidly
regulates political discourse by suppressing certain views, thereby
advancing others. The business of government does not include us-
ing its regulatory power to shape a political viewpoint. It does not
matter that the objectionable criticism or advocacy occurs in an
"artistic" work. For example, the Supreme Court held that a state
could not censor as "sacrilegious" a film showing adultery in an
"conduct" rather than speech, thus triggering a less stringent standard of review. 579 F.2d
516, 520 (1978). This labeling simply masked the necessity of identifying and weighing the
interests at stake.
58. See Van Astyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 107,
139-40 (1982).
59. See Linde, Courts and Censorship, 66 MINN. L. REV. 171, 204 (1981).
60. "Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the
power to control men's minds." Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1969); Kleindienst
v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 772 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
61. 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905).
62. Id. at 76.
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allegedly favorable light." Government censorship remains inap-
propriate even if the censorship flows from the government's oppo-
sition to the political views of the artist, writer, or composer, unre-
lated to any supposed message in an artistic work. This censorship
represents simply an indirect effort to silence ideas to which the
government is hostile.
One commentator has suggested that government regulation of
artistic expression generally is invalid because it almost always in-
volves hostility to a point of view either in the work of art or of the
artist. 4 Certainly this accounts for much of the impetus for censor-
ship of the arts. Other commentators have relied on the contribu-
tion which the arts make to the individual's overall ability to par-
ticipate intelligently in the political process6 5 or generally to his
self-fulfilment.6 6 None of these observations criticizing govern-
ment regulations, however, are required to support the view that
the first amendment protects the arts against government
censorship.
Consider a case where government regulation flows strictly from
a concern that a particular category of art or music is not worthy
of public attention. The government is seeking to control what is
performed as a means of elevating the public's cultural tastes.
Again, the first amendment does not permit this because such gov-
ernment regulation focuses on thought control. Government regu-
lation is prohibited despite a sincere and well founded belief that
the public would be benefitted, for example, if rock music were
banned and more classical music were played. The first amend-
ment, however, does permit the government affirmatively to foster
and encourage one kind of artistic expression over another. Thus
the government may teach appreciation of classical music in the
public schools, finance the public performance of Mozart, but re-
63. Kingsley Int'l. Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
64. F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 111 (1981). Contrary to Professor
Schauer's view, id. at 181-88, this hostile attitude may exist even with so-called "obscenity",
which the Court has defined out of the first amendment. The concern with obscenity funda-
mentally involves a desire to control the individual's attitudes about sexual behavior. The
concern remains that material primarily depicting sexual practices in an explicit and offen-
sive way will have a particularly corrosive effect on moral attitudes. Id. at 181-88; see Hen-
kin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUh. L. REv. 391 (1963).
65. Meiklejohn, supra note 49, at 256-57.
66. M. REDISH, supra note 37, at 57.
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fuse to fund a comparable rock concert, and create new public fo-
rums designed to foster presentation or discussion of particular
subject matter.17
Another area of first amendment concern involves the regulation
of commercial speech. Without reference to the value attributable
to a particular example of commercial speech, the first amendment
here also limits the objective for which government may regulate.
Therefore, commercial speech regulation designed to affect public
attitudes and behavior regarding an advertised product or service
should be held invalid. 8 This limitation is consistent with sus-
taining some regulation barring false or misleading advertising be-
cause this limitation involves an effort to ensure the integrity of
the individual's decisionmaking.69 It also is consistent with forbid-
ding an offer of an illegal product or service because this choice has
been foreclosed.70
Political speech is the one speech category that should be differ-
entiated in terms of the values it serves. The effect of a regulation
in suppressing or advancing a political view ought to have indepen-
dent significance even if the objective for which the regulation was
adopted has nothing to do with shaping viewpoints. Regulation
controlling speech directly related to issues of public policy de-
mands strict review.7 1
This corollary is offered for two reasons. First, regulation having
an effect on public policy strongly suggests an illicit regulatory
purpose, which the government almost always will deny with a
measure of plausibility. While actual proof of improper purpose
therefore would be difficult, the government's strong incentive to
shape public opinion through a variety of means, some quite sub-
tle, is undeniable. Second, regulation suppressing a political view,
67. Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CA-
LW. L. REv. 1104, 1110-13 (1979).
68. Virginia Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. at 770; Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431
U.S. 85, 96 (1977). There is, however, a contrary implication in Central Hudson Gas, 447
U.S. at 569-72. Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion strongly and properly objected to
this. 447 U.S. at 573-75.
69. See M. REDISH, supra note 37, at 64-65.
70. This is distinguished from protected advocacy for the legalization of a product or ser-
vice. Cf. National Soc'y of Professional Eng. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 697-98 (1978).
71. Cf. Comment, First Amendment Standards for Subsequent Punishment of Dissemi-
nation of Confidential Government Information, 68 CAIF. L. REv. 83, 102-04 (1980).
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regardless of the regulation's objective, poses a direct and immedi-
ate threat to the process by which the people maintain some check
on all government activities. 2 Regulation having a nonpolitical af-
fect on other forms of speech creates no such threat. For similar
reasons, and in contrast with the position taken on fostering the
arts, government dissemination of its own views, "government
speech," and government subsidization of private speech with the
purpose or effect of advancing a political view also should be
suspect.7 1
2. Application of Alternative Analysis to Scientific and Tech-
nological Speech
Assume a provable governmental purpose to distort public policy
or scientific debate. All such efforts to suppress scientific or techni-
cal information to shape public or scientific opinion should be in-
valid. Consider the earlier reference to the new theory on a "nu-
clear winter. '74 Government officials could have decided that
release of these theories would have unreasonably intensified pub-
lic fear over the threat of nuclear war and would have increased
pressure on the government to make unwarranted concessions in
nuclear disarmament talks. The attempt to censor this theory
clearly would violate the first amendment because of the illicit gov-
ernmental purpose. As explained below, however, instances may
arise of a legitimate security need to suppress information even
though the effect would be to distort debate.
Assume that an illicit governmental purpose cannot be proved
but that an inevitable effect of governmental regulation is to skew
scientific debate. Assume further no adverse impact on any debate
involving public policy. Although most scientific and technological
information does not bear on any public issue, it may involve the
"search for truth" within the field as well as individual self-fulfill-
ment. Suppression of the information may injure the process of
free interchange important both to scientific progress and to the
individual scientist's development. Thus the question in most in-
stances is whether, notwithstanding these detriments, the govern-
72. See Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 A.B.F. REs. J. 521.
73. Kamenshine, supra note 67, at 1113-22.
74. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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ment may curtail dissemination of scientific and technological in-
formation for national security reasons.
The government may adopt security policies limiting disclosure
of scientific and technological information notwithstanding adverse
side effects on scientific progress and self-fulfillment and remain
consistent with the view that the foundation of the first amend-
ment is denial of the government's power to try and control view-
point. First, little reason exists to suspect that a national security
regulation having these side effects actually was intended to distort
scientific debate. Second, a valid national security purpose can be
linked only tenuously to illicit thought control. No plan can be
found to shape ideas in the abstract nor to control viewpoint to
prevent "undesirable" behavior. Rather, the assumption in this
discussion is that persons, groups, or nations already are commit-
ted to, or are threatening to use force against our society. The sci-
entific and technological information represents a means to an end
in the same sense as a weapon. Therefore, subject to a rational ba-
sis review by the courts, the government appropriately may bal-
ance the adverse impact on scientific development and self-fulfill-
ment against the national security interest.
Assume finally the most difficult situation, when no illicit pur-
pose can be established but when the information to be suppressed
has a relationship to existing issues of public policy or would tend
to create such an issue, especially by discrediting a position ad-
vanced by government spokesmen. Based on my alternative analy-
sis, I support a strong presumption against this suppression, i.e.,
courts should invoke strict scrutiny.7 5 One easily can hypothesize
75. For discussion of the factors pertinent to strict review of restraints on dissemination
of scientific and technological information, see Alexander, supra note 1, at 205-08; Ferguson,
supra note 6, at 554-58; Comment, supra note 6, at 439-40. Although the authors are not in
total agreement, they share a substantial identity of approach.
The most speech-protective formulation, with which I agree, appears in Comment, supra
note 6. To constitute a "compelling" threat to national security, the danger would have to
be "immediate, certain and exceptional." The information would be such as to enable "a
potential or actual enemy to develop a significant weapon or countermeasure to a United
States weapon within a period of time too short for the United States to take corrective
steps." The threat would be "immediate" "if the time from its receipt by a foreign power to
its actual application is short as measured on an appropriate time scale of technological
development." The threat would be "certain" "when it has identifiable direct military uses
or related production applicability" and would be "exceptional" "when it would give the
enemy an identifiable, material advantage over the United States in military terms." The
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situations in which the nation's security would be seriously
threatened by publication of information highly pertinent to a
public debate.76 The strict review standard acknowledges not only
that a vital governmental interest sometimes must take precedence
over adverse effect on open debate 7 but also that those instances
must be minimized.
Once a party objecting to government suppression established
the necessary public issue relationship, the government then would
have the burden of demonstrating a compelling necessity for its
regulation. Unlike the case in which only scientific debate is dis-
torted, a great risk exists that the government is using national
security as a pretext to pursue an improper objective of skewing
public policy discussion. Also, no matter how legitimate and im-
portant the government's actual suppression objective, the effect
will be manipulation of public opinion. Public policy debate marks
the only instance in national security regulation when effect alone
should trigger a heightened standard of review.
IV. APPLICABILITY OF ANCILLARY FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINES
This Article has established that most technological and scien-
tific speech may be regulated upon the showing of a rational rela-
tionship to a national security objective. The Article now considers
ancillary doctrines which have been used to safeguard freedom of
speech.
A. Standard of Review for Prior Restraints
The Court in New York Times Co. v. United States (the Penta-
gon Papers case)7 8 and Near v. Minnesota7 maintained that only
the strictest necessity will justify a prior restraint. Both cases illus-
final requirement would be that the United States be "the exclusive source of the informa-
tion." Comment, supra note 6, at 440.
76. See Linde, supra note 59, at 198-99; Van Aistyne, supra note 58, at 113-14.
77. One commentator has observed that for "national security data" the "less restrictive
alternative" of regulating the use to which the information is put is not available. "By defi-
nition, the perceived danger in such a setting is posed by hostile nations or terrorist groups
who would not be deterred by, or even subject to, criminal prosecution." Ferguson, supra
note 6, at 553-54.
78. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
79. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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trate attempted censorship of clearly political speech. Most tech-
nological and scientific information, however, should be subject to
prior restraint on national security grounds without having to meet
the Near-Pentagon Papers standard.s Normally the government
may balance the need for national security against the interest of
advancing science or technology through open exchange of infor-
mation. Strict review, roughly equivalent to the Near-Pentagon
Papers standard,"' would be reserved in both prior censorship and
subsequent punishment cases for situations when the questioned
material related to matters of public policy.
The district court in Progressive found that "the government
ha[d] met its heavy [Near] burden of showing justification for the
imposition of a prior restraint on publication of the objected-to
technical portions of the . . . article. 8 2 This conclusion is open to
criticism.8 3 As mentioned earlier, however, the court also remained
"unconvinced that suppression. . . would in any plausible fashion
impede the defendants in their laudable crusade to stimulate pub-
lic knowledge of nuclear armament and bring about enlightened
debate on national policy questions. 8s4 The district court's focus
on the relevance of the H-bomb plan to a public issue was not re-
quired by the Near-Pentagon Papers standard. The focus, how-
ever, is consonant with the approach in the alternative analysis
which sharply reduces the government's burden in obtaining a
prior restraint on publication of information which has only a tech-
nological significance.
B. Special First Amendment Procedural Safeguards
1. Judicial Review of Prior Restraints
In prior restraint cases, the Court has demanded not only a
showing of strict necessity for the restraint but also special proce-
80. This assumes, contrary to usual first amendment doctrine, that the standard of review
should remain the same regardless of whether there is a prior or subsequent restraint. See
M. REDISH, supra note 37, at 127.
81. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101-02 (1979).
82. 467 F. Supp. at 996.
83. Cheh, The Progressive Case and the Atomic Energy Act: Waking to the Dangers of
Government Information Controls, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 163, 199 (1980).
84. 467 F. Supp. at 996.
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dural safeguards ensuring prompt judicial review. 5 Although this
Article has shown that dissemination of a large percentage of sci-
entific and technological material safely could be subject to prior
restraint under a rational basis standard, the question of proce-
dural safeguards remains for discussion. No strong reason for these
safeguards exists if prior censorship would never involve illicit mo-
tivation or substantial detriment to political discourse. But as pre-
viously discussed, this assumption cannot be made. Given the con-
sequent risk of damage to the political process through prior
censorship of scientific and technological material, a strong basis
for stringent procedural safeguards exists."6
2. Restriction of Informal Censorship
In Bantam Books v. Sullivan,87 the Court found that a system of
informal government censorship of books believed obscene violated
the first amendment. One commentator cited the decision as mak-
ing suspect the efforts at informal cooperation between govern-
ment representatives and groups of scientists to control the dis-
semination of sensitive material.8 Two fundamental problems
arise with drawing this inference from Bantam Books. First, the
decision's relevance is difficult to assess given the opinion's lack of
clarity. Second, an opinion relating to obscenity control should not
be applied uncritically to the control of scientific information.
The Court in Bantam Books clearly was concerned that the
Rhode Island Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth used
censorship which circumvented constitutionally required safe-
85. National Socialist Party v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977); Freedman v. Mary-
land, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965).
86. Professor Redish has suggested that any use of administrative prior restraints in "na-
tional security" cases is unjustified and that "[t]he courts' are... the only proper forum
for restricting publication ...... M. RFDISH, supra note 37, at 158. This position is based on
the dangers to freedom of speech from regulation encompassing more than dissemination of
scientific or technological information. For example, the material might be comparable to
the study of the government decision-making process leading to involvement in the Viet-
Nam War at issue in the Pentagon Papers case and New York Times. 403 U.S. at 713.
Although the material manifestly related to a vital policy debate on the war, the security
interest advanced by the government was not in denying scientific or technological informa-
tion to a possible military adversary, but in preventing embarassment in the conduct of
United States foreign policy.
87. 372 U.S. 58 (1963)
88. See Alexander, supra note 6, at 216.
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guards for regulation of obscenity.8 9 The opinion concluded by dis-
tinguishing the Commission's activities from those of law enforce-
ment officers engaged in informal meetings with possible law
violators.90 A concurring opinion by Justice Clark9' found that the
Commission's overall functioning was not objectionable. Rather,
the problem was its coercive tactics in making intimidating threats
of legal action. Otherwise, he found no fault in the Commission's
reviewing books and making public recommendations. The major-
ity, however, may have been concerned that unlike an informal
opinion by an individual law enforcement official, the Commission
appeared to be making an authoritative public determination that
certain books were obscene. Even though the Commission lacked
enforcement power, first amendment and due process considera-
tions arguably precluded this official determination without an ap-
propriate hearing.92
Informal cooperation between government agencies and scien-
tific organizations more closely resembles the permissible meetings
with law enforcement officials because no agency purports to make
an authoritative public determination of illegality. Moreover, al-
though informal control of scientific and technological information
is unlikely to involve the Rhode Island Commission's methodology,
it is of equal importance that first amendment values at stake in
the two cases are different. Having erroneously categorized obscen-
ity as unprotected, the Court has taken steps to ensure that anti-
obscenity enforcement also does not limit protected artistic speech,
the regulation of which involves an illicit attempt to control view-
point. The line between obscenity and protected speech is inher-
ently unclear,93 and the government becomes involved in making
improper artistic value judgments. Jenkins v. Georgia94 demon-
strates the risks of obscenity enforcement and the need for contin-
uing Supreme Court supervision. In Jenkins the Court was com-
pelled to reverse an obscenity conviction for showing a well-
respected motion picture.
89. 372 U.S. at 69-70.
90. Id. at 71-72.
91. Id. at 74.
92. See Monaghan, First Amendment Due Process, 83 HARv. L. RE V. 518 (1970).
93. Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 83-85 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94. 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
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National security controls on scientific and technological speech
also involve some risk of constitutionally suspect regulation. This
risk increases the need for prompt judicial review of enforceable
prior restraints, even though most prior restraints would be re-
viewed under only a rational basis test. The risk of suspect security
regulation, however, is minor compared to the substantial risk that
protected artistic speech will be censored in the name of obscenity
control.
Normally the purpose and effect of security controls on scientific
and technological information legitimately prevents militarily sen-
sitive information from reaching our adversaries. Therefore, infor-
mal consultation between government agencies and private re-
searchers sensibly permits a less restrictive means of achieving
security objectives. Moreover, these nonpublic consultations are
unlikely to be as effective a means of censoring politically relevant
material as were the Rhode Island Commission's public activities
stifling protected artistic expression. The difference in effective-
ness would be especially pronounced with scientists who believed
that the government, in the name of security, was attempting to
stifle disclosure of material with high political relevance.
C. Curtailment of Vagueness and Overbreadth
The Supreme Court's hostility toward vague or overbroad laws
which substantially impinge on freedom of speech is well known.9
This hostility stems from concern that statutes or regulations serv-
ing a valid purpose should not also jeopardize protected communi-
cation. The decisions invalidating regulation for vagueness or over-
breadth normally involve a threat to protected political speech.
Given the Court's approach to so-called subversive advocacy by
which only the most narrow category of political speech may be
punished,9" any particular regulation of political speech likely will
be found unjustified. Therefore, the high sensitivity in political
speech cases to problems of vagueness and overbreadth in statutes
and regulations remains appropriate given the likely inhibition of
protected speech.
95. See M. NIMmER, FREEDOM OF SPEECH §§ 4.11 [A], [E][1] (1984).
96. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927-29 (1982); Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
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In contrast to political speech, this Article assumes that most
scientific and technological speech may be regulated on a rational
basis standard. Therefore, in any particular case, the risk is low
that a regulation of such speech will inhibit communication which
the government may not regulate. This low risk undercuts the ap-
plicability of the first amendment overbreadth and vagueness doc-
trines. The conclusion, however, does not depend on reasoning by
analogy to the commercial speech decisions. In the commercial
speech cases, the Court rejected attacks based on overbreadth and
vagueness because commercial speech is "hardy" and consequently
not likely to be inhibited by overbroad or vague regulations.9 This
explanation may be questionable given the strong commercial mo-
tivation for other forms of expression which merit the benefit of
these doctrines. 8
V. CONDITIONAL GRANTS TO PRIVATE RESEARCHERS
A. Unconstitutional Conditions
Because much ostensibly private scientific research is govern-
ment funded, the government may feel entitled to restrict dissemi-
nation of the resulting work product. The unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine offers the usual perspective from which to evaluate
attempted restrictions on the first amendment rights of govern-
ment grantees.99 According to this doctrine, the validity of condi-
tions on such grantees' freedom of speech is judged by first amend-
ment standards as if the conditions restricted grantees and
nongrantees alike. The government's interests in controlling the
behavior of a grantee, however, may be different from and more
substantial than those it has vis-A-vis the general population.100
Therefore, sometimes the government constitutionally could regu-
late grantees more extensively.
97. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
771, 772 n.24 (1976).
98. M. REDISH, supra note 37, at 64.
99. M. NiMESR, supra note 95, § 4.08; Note, Executive Order 12,356, supra note 6, at
482-85.
100. M. NIMMER, supra note 95, § 4.08, at 437-38.
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B. Government as Owner or Purchaser of Private Research
The government could be viewed as having an ownership inter-
est, somewhat analogous to a copyright, in the resultant work
product of government funded scientific research. The government
may rely on this interest to justify grant conditions on dissemina-
tion, including requirements of prepublication review.1°
Rather than merely considering ownership as an interest to be
weighed under appropriate first amendment standards, a different
view of government funding appears to avoid first amendment
scrutiny. The government may choose the constitutionally pro-
tected activities it wants to subsidize. For example, it might pay
for a scholar's research and publication of materials on American
History but decline to fund similar work on European History.
Selective promotion of research applies as well to science and
technology because numerous projects are vying for federal sup-
port. Normally a grant applicant contemplates research, writing,
and dissemination to the scientific community and perhaps to a
wider audience. The government may argue, however, that it may
do more than select the subject matter and a particular applicant.
It may claim that it can pay solely for projects with limited dis-
semination objectives in accord with established national security
guidelines. This government position arguably would involve no
unconstitutional condition on the exercise of freedom of speech
but simply a willingness to pay for only some speech.
Two recent Supreme Court first amendment decisions, Regan v.
Taxation with Representation,02 and FCC v. League of Women
Voters,10 3 provide a framework for analyzing dissemination restric-
tions on government funded research. In Regan, the Court, in an
opinion by Justice Rehnquist, held that the first amendment per-
mitted the denial of section 501(c)(3) tax exempt status, a form of
subsidy, to organizations which engaged in substantial lobbying ac-
tivity. 04 The Court reasoned that although protected first amend-
101. See Alexander, supra note 1, at 232-35; cf. United States v. Snepp, 447 U.S. 507
(1980) (CIA employee); United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.) (CIA em-
ployee), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972); Comment, supra note 71.
102. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
103. 104 S. Ct. 3106 (1984).
104. The Court refused to allow Taxation With Representation of Washington (TRW) to
qualify as a section 501(c)(3) (I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982)) organization that would permit any
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ment activity, such as lobbying, might not disqualify a person or
organization from an otherwise available government benefit, the
government had no obligation to fund the first amendment activity
itself. Funding on a politically discriminatory basis still would be
constitutionally suspect. 105
More recently, in League of Women Voters, the Court ruled in-
valid section 399 of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967's01o prohi-
bition of editorialization by public broadcasting stations receiving
Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) grants. 1 7 The Court
rejected the government's reliance on Regan, emphasizing that in
Regan the Internal Revenue Code permitted a lobbying charitable
organization to create a nonlobbying affiliate to conduct activities
using tax deductible charitable contributions.'0 " By comparison, a
public station receiving only a minute portion of its general funds
from CPB would be barred totally from editorializing with no op-
portunity to segregate its editorializing and noneditorializing pro-
gramming activities according to the source of the funds.109
Dissemination restrictions in government grants may occur in
three contexts: (1) when the project is totally government funded;
(2) when the project is partially government funded; and (3) when
none of the project is government funded but when the grantees
receive grants for other purposes. The Regan argument which re-
futes any obligation to finance speech, would be strongest in case
(1), weaker but still controlling in case (2)," ° and inapposite in
contribution to TRW to be tax deductible. The Court did allow, however, TRW to retain its
section 501(c)(4) (LR.C. § 501(c)(4) (1982)) tax exempt status, permitting TRW to receive
contributions for its lobbying activities without paying income tax on those contributions.
461 U.S. at 543-44.
105. 461 U.S. at 548.
106. 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-405 (1982).
107. 104 S. Ct. at 3127-28.
108. Id. at 3128.
109. Justice Rehnquist, however, now in dissent, focused on subsidization of functions
rather than particular programming. If, as the record showed, a station received 20 to 30
percent of its operating funds for salaries, equipment, and training, all aspects of the sta-
tion's functioning, including editorializing, benefited proportionately. He argued, therefore,
that it was reasonable for the government to prevent this subsidization of editorializing by a
total ban on the activity. 104 S. Ct. at 3131-32.
110. The first amendment analysis may be made more complex when the government
pays for only a portion of a project. This situation, however, is closer to Regan than to
League of Women Voters. The League opinion evidently viewed the public station as con-
ducting a myriad of distinct activities. As the Court saw it, the government was refusing to
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case (3) for which League of Women Voters would be
controlling."'.
C. First Amendment Scrutiny Despite Owner or Purchaser
Analysis
The preceding discussion of the subsidization rationale in Regan
may be inconsequential in view of the earlier alternative analysis of
the first amendment's impact on dissemination restrictions. As
noted, Regan recognized that the government could not choose to
subsidize only those political views with which it agreed.1 2 The
Court concluded, however, that the exclusion of veterans groups
from the lobbying prohibition did not constitute such
discrimination." 3
Even if government completely subsidized a scientific research
project, a governmental purpose to suppress dissemination of re-
sults because of their likely impact on public policy would be inva-
lid. Moreover, courts still would apply strict review to cases in
which the restrictions' effect was to deprive the public of informa-
tion relevant to such an issue." 4 When public policy debate was
subsidize any of these activities unless the station refrained from one-its first amendment
right to editorialize. It is questionable whether each of the programming activities of a
broadcasting station should be considered distinct for purposes of analyzing conditions on
subsidies.
Moreover, the result in League may have been different if the government said it would
not provide grants to any station which spent a substantial portion of its activity in editori-
alizing. Taking the facts and conclusion in League as a given, however, a partially govern-
ment funded scientific research project is evidently dissimilar. Such a project would be more
comparable to one for which the government made a partial grant for a music program
provided that the program be for classical music disseminated solely to children. The gov-
ernment, as in Regan, still would be entitled to subsidize only the project it favored.
111. The situation most closely approximating League of Women Voters would be a grant
for general university purposes, perhaps for science buildings or equipment, provided that
the institution comply with restrictions on dissemination of specified scientific research. An
even clearer situation in which first amendment rights would apply occurs when the govern-
ment conditions a university's eligibility for funds for a particular project, such as a new
gymnasium, on compliance with similar guidelines. The project from which funds might be
cut would have no relationship with any research to which the restrictions applied. In both
instances, the Court would use the same first amendment standards as if a direct content
regulation were imposed on dissemination of the research.
112. 461 U.S. at 548.
113. Id. at 548-51.
114. Id. at 548; see League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. at 3132 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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not implicated, dissemination restrictions on funded research
would have to meet the same rational basis scrutiny as would simi-
lar restrictions on unfunded research. 115
VI. INDIRECT MEANS OF STEMMING THE OUTFLOW OF SCIENTIFIC
AND TECHNOLOGICAL INFORMATION
Means other than content controls may be invoked to slow the
drain of scientific and technological information from the country.
These means include: (1) excluding certain aliens from the United
States; (2) allowing these aliens to enter but forbidding their par-
ticipation in specified conferences, courses, seminars, or more indi-
vidualized academic programs; and (3) restricting foreign travel by
United States citizens or limiting their participation in foreign
conferences.
A. Excluding Aliens
Kleindienst v. Mandel 6 recognized an independent first
amendment value in the face-to-face exchange of ideas between
United States students and scholars and an alien Marxist scholar,
Mandel, even if other reasonable means of communication were
available. The Court, though, found no need to balance the first
amendment values against the government's facially legitimate in-
terest, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, in excluding Mandel
from the country. On prior visits to the United States, he appar-
ently had violated certain visa restrictions. 17 These visa violations
formed the stated basis of the attorney general's refusal to exempt
him' 8 from a statutory standard which denied visitors visas to
aliens who advocated communism. 18
Justice Marshall's dissent observed that the Court's focus on the
statutory exception process was misplaced because ultimately the
exclusion rested on a law which unconstitutionally denied visas on
115. Justice Rehnquist's dissent in League of Women Voters states that absent a politi-
cally discriminatory objective, "when the government is simply exercising its power to allo-
cate its own public funds, we need only find that the condition imposed has a rational rela-
tionship to Congress' purpose in providing the subsidy. . . ." 104 S. Ct. at 3132.
116. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
117. Id. at 758.
118. Id. at 759.
119. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(G)(V) (1982).
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an ideological basis.120 In justification of the majority's approach
which focused solely on the exception process, exceptions had been
granted routinely in the past, including two for Mandel. 121 There-
fore the majority reasonably regarded the statutory criterion of
communist views as essentially nullified in practice.
If one considers the legitimacy of a viewpoint-based exclusion, a
fundamental difference undeniably exists between merely admit-
ting ideas into the country and admitting their proponent. An indi-
vidual's views alone, however, unless they normally would subject
him to criminal punishment, should not be a valid basis for exclud-
ing him. The appropriate standard for exclusion should be whether
the alien poses a threat to United States security by actions he is
likely to take once admitted. Unpopular views are insufficient evi-
dence of a threat. 22 In some cases, however, those views coupled
with additional evidence might outweigh an audience's first
amendment interest in face-to-face contact.
Similar concerns exist with the exclusion of an alien, not for
what he wants to say, but for what he wants to receive by the way
of scientific and technological communication. This exclusion de-
prives United States communicators of a face-to-face audience for
their ideas. As discussed earlier, under certain circumstances the
communication of information to a foreign recipient may be for-
bidden altogether. Therefore, in such cases the loss of a face-to-
face audience for United States communicators would be of no in-
dependent concern. Nevertheless, while this ban on foreign recipi-
ents of communication does not involve censorship of ideas enter-
ing the country, the net result, as in Mandel, eliminates whatever
benefit a United States audience derives from face-to-face contact
with a speaker.
The Court concluded in Mandel that a facially legitimate reason
for exclusion, which includes slowing the outflow of sensitive infor-
mation, obviated any need to balance the alien's interest against
the audience's interest in face-to-face communication. Assuming,
despite recent improvement in communications technology, that
face-to-face contact still represents a significant first amendment
120. 408 U.S. at 774, 779-80 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 756.
122. See 408 U.S. at 774 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 771 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
1985]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
value, Mandel's deference to the government goes too far. The
Court should examine closely the government's justification for ex-
clusion, such as preventing loss of scientific or technological infor-
mation, if evidence suggests politically relevant material will be
barred from presentation in the United States. Again, this exclu-
sion normally would not be a problem for scientific and technologi-
cal communication. Thus, in most instances, evidence offering a ra-
tional basis for concluding that the visitor-communicator might
pick up sensitive information would be enough to justify his exclu-
sion. Otherwise, the Court should strictly review the exclusion, in-
cluding the possibility of mandating less restrictive alternatives
such as allowing the alien to enter but placing limitations on his
information gathering activities. 23
An additional first amendment value protected from the govern-
ment's effort to exclude an alien on security grounds involves
schools' ability to select their students. Justice Powell's tie-break-
ing opinion discussed this value in University of California Re-
gents v. Bakke. 24 Assuming the existence of such an independent
first amendment right, no reason arises to differentiate a univer-
sity's position towards an alien student whom it wants for a nu-
clear physics course and its stance toward an alien scientist whom
it wants as a participant in a conference. The university's interest
in selecting a student to enhance diversity or otherwise improve
the educational environment is comparable to its interest in facili-
tating face-to-face discussion with a foreign scientist.
B. Conditional Admission of Aliens
A further question regarding admission of aliens is whether the
analysis concerning their exclusion changes when the alien is ad-
mitted but is limited in his activities. These security restrictions
may forbid attendance at certain meetings or enrollment in partic-
ular courses. Whether the visiting alien now has first amendment
rights should make no difference 12 5 because such rights would be
123. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
124. 438 U.S. 265, 311-15 (1978).
125. The normal sanction for violation of visa conditions would be deportation. This may
be predicated on grounds that would be invalid if made the basis of criminal punishment.
See generally J. NOWA, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1090 (2d ed. 1983)
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greater than those already possessed by the persons with whom the
alien would be communicating. Accordingly, the same analytic ap-
proach should be applied for limitations on an alien's activities as
total exclusion.
C. Restricting Foreign Travel by United States Citizens
Another method of dealing with the outflow of scientific and
technological information may be to restrict foreign travel of
United States scientists and engineers when such travel is for the
purpose of conferring with foreign counterparts. This restriction
represents another form of a limitation on face-to-face contact.
The Court has held in Zemel v. Rusk 2 that foreign travel is a
liberty interest protected by fifth amendment due process and sub-
ject to regulation on a rational basis standard. Foreign travel is not
in itself a fundamental right under the first amendment.
In Haig v. Agee,'127 the Court in sustaining the revocation of a
former CIA agent's passport considered an argument that his first
amendment rights were being penalized. Agee had been traveling
to various countries and publicly identifying individuals and orga-
nizations located there as CIA undercover agents, employees, or
sources.' 28 The Court's cursory rejection of his first amendment ar-
gument was preceded with the begrudging statement that it was
only "[a]ssuming arguendo, that First Amendment protections
reach beyond our national boundaries." 2 9
The Court in Mandel said that a facially legitimate reason suf-
ficed to deny an alien speaker entrance to the United States and
(congressional authority to deport aliens is subject to broad discretion). Moreover, in the
case of a breach of express entry conditions, if the alien has been notified appropriately he
has assented to the conditions by entering the country.
126. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
127. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
128. Id. at 283-84.
129. Id. at 308. During oral argument, Solicitor General McCree was asked whether the
Secretary of State could refuse to issue a passport on the grounds that the applicant was
journeying to El Salvador to denounce United States support of the ruling junta. The Solici-
tor General responded yes. He pointed to the foreign policy responsibility of the President
and the Secretary of State and observed that the "freedom of speech that that we enjoy
domestically may be different from that we can exercise in this context." Id. at 319 n.9
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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thereby preclude face-to-face contact.' 30 But the right at stake in
Mandel did not belong to Mandel but to United States scholars
and students. Therefore Mandel suggests that these same scholars
and students would have no greater first amendment right to leave
the country for face-to-face contact than they would have to have
Mandel enter. Like entry restrictions on aliens, however, I would
afford foreign travel by United States citizens a significant degree
of first amendment protection. Permission to travel could not be
denied for the purpose of punishing the traveler for his political
views or attempting to skew scientific or political debate. 13' Fur-
ther, a demonstrated effect of skewing political debate would trig-
ger strict review of the government's justifications. Similar reason-
ing would apply when travel is permitted but limitations are
placed on participation in certain conferences, or seminars.
VII. CONCLUSION
Short range benefits from regulations curtailing scientific and
technological dissemination often may be outweighed by long
range detriments to progress in these areas. To a large degree na-
tional security ultimately depends on such progress. Therefore,
reconciling the benefits of free trade in scientific and technological
ideas with the legitimate concern that accessible information will
be used against our country is not easy. The first amendment poses
critical questions concerning the constitutional parameters within
which the government may do its balancing.
If one believes in maximizing the benefits of an open society in
the fields of science and technology, as I do, it would be nice to be
able to say that the first amendment dictates this result. This is
essentially the conclusion which prior authors have reached. How-
ever, this Article suggests that the government in fact has much
greater constitutional maneuvering room. This latitude derives
first from the dichotomy between foreign and domestic dissemina-
130. 408 U.S. at 769.
131. See Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984). The opinion emphasized that the Secre-
tary of State in Wald and in Zemel "made no effort selectively to deny passports on the
basis of political belief or affiliation." Id. at 3038. "First Amendment rights . . . controlled"
in prior decisions invalidating attempts to limit foreign travel by Communists. Aptheker v.
Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
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tion and second from an alternative perspective on the purpose of
the first amendment.
With dissemination solely to a foreign audience, a regulation's
adverse effect on traditional first amendment values is minimized.
With dissemination to a domestic audience, when traditional val-
ues clearly are implicated, most regulation would be consistent
with the first amendment's role forbidding regulation aimed at
viewpoint manipulation. The first amendment's primary task here
is to ensure that security regulation having the purpose or effect of
skewing debate on public policy issues be subjected to the strong-
est presumption of invalidity. This type of security regulation,
threatening the democratic process itself, presents the most urgent
constitutional concern.
